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OVERVIEW — This paper defines the average wholesale price (AWP), which
has become an important benchmark for prescription drug pricing and reim-
bursement. The paper briefly explains the AWP’s various uses in the pricing of
prescription drugs, highlights some of the problems that have emerged as a
result of the way it is reported and used, and explores some of the possibilities
for reform. The paper also contains a glossary of commonly used terms, as well
as an appendix that lists the state Medicaid reimbursement formulas.
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Prescription drug pricing has moved center stage in a health care industry
that is becoming more and more complex. With the inclusion of new groups
of stakeholders, more varied incentive systems, greater competition, and
more complicated benefit structures, the “true” cost of prescription drugs
has grown increasingly elusive. Drug prices are subject to various types of
discounts and rebates, seen and unseen, on both the public and private side.
Each drug sold by a manufacturer, therefore, is subject to multiple prices,
and little is known publicly about this pricing information. In addition, the
issue of drug pricing has implications for other payment systems, such as
the Medicare resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) for physician re-
imbursement and the state Medicaid reimbursement formulas for prescrip-
tion drugs. In certain instances where providers or pharmacies believe they
are inadequately compensated for administering or dispensing prescription
drugs, an inflated average wholesale price (AWP) is relied upon to make up
the difference. From a policy perspective, therefore, the AWP is part of a
larger pricing infrastructure that requires examination.  The continued de-
bate about the establishment of a comprehensive Medicare prescription drug
benefit has only intensified policymakers’ focus on drug prices.
At a time when health care costs are climbing and prescription drug
spending is increasing at double-digit rates,1 both public and private pay-
ers are under pressure to find ways to control outlays. As part of this
effort, significant scrutiny has focused on the appropriateness of the AWP
as a mechanism for prescription drug reimbursement. Over the last sev-
eral years, the AWP has been the subject of investigations, litigation, and
legislative proposals. Though imperfect, the AWP has come to represent
a starting point for determining prescription drug reimbursement for
public and private payers. As it has evolved, however, many argue that
it has moved so far from the actual acquisition prices for prescription
drugs that it fails to serve as a meaningful benchmark. Attempts at pay-
ment reform inevitably raise significant concerns about the potential im-
pact on payment systems and stakeholders.
WHAT IS THE AWP AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?
The AWP, or average wholesale price, of prescription drugs was intended to
represent the average price at which wholesalers sell drugs to physicians,
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pharmacies, and other customers. In practice, it is a figure reported by
commercial publishers of drug pricing data, such as First DataBank and
Thomson Medical Economics. According to the Red Book, published by
Thomson Medical Economics, the pricing information is “based on data
obtained from manufacturers, distributors, and other suppliers.”2 This
pricing information is then sold to government entities, private insur-
ance companies, and other purchasers of prescription drugs.
The AWP has often been equated with a “sticker price” or “list price,”
as those terms are used in the automobile industry. It has become an
important prescription drug pricing benchmark for payers throughout
the health care industry. Payments are typically based on AWP minus
some percentage. Despite its name, however, the AWP is not an accu-
rate reflection of actual market prices for drugs. As noted, it is a price
derived from self-reported manufacturer data for both branded and
generic drugs. There are no requirements or conventions that the AWP
reflect the price of any actual sale of drugs by a manufacturer, or that it
be updated at established intervals. It is not defined in law or regula-
tion, and it fails to account for the deep discounts available to various
payers, including certain federal agencies, providers, and large purchas-
ers, such as HMOs. Consequently, the AWP has been the subject of great
criticism and scrutiny.
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the AWP may
be neither “average” nor “wholesale.”3 In addition, a recent investigation
by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the National Association of
Medicaid Fraud Control Units (NAMFCU), which involved the collec-
tion of actual wholesale pricing information, indicated that some drug
manufacturers report inflated average wholesale pricing information.4
Because the AWP is part of the reimbursement formula used in Medicare
Part B and by many state Medicaid programs, any increase in the pub-
lished AWP can increase the billions of dollars that federal and state gov-
ernments pay for prescription drugs. Medicare beneficiaries, who are re-
sponsible for 20 percent coinsurance for the drugs covered under Part B,
would also bear an increased financial burden.
Some manufacturers argue that they do not set the AWP for their drugs
and are therefore not in a position to inflate these prices. They maintain
that the commercial publishers of drug pricing data independently as-
sess and report a drug’s AWP. Despite these claims, it is clear that the
manufacturers must provide some level of pricing data to commercial
publishers to enable them to publish AWP lists.
MEDICARE
As Congress struggles with proposals to develop an outpatient Medicare
prescription drug benefit for seniors,5 significant attention has been paid
to the high cost of prescription drugs and the mechanisms employed to
determine the government reimbursement rate. Though Medicare does
The AWP has often
been equated with a
“sticker price” or “list
price.”
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not have a comprehensive outpatient prescription drug benefit, Medi-
care Part B does cover approximately 450 drugs and biologicals.
The following categories of outpatient drugs are covered under Medicare
Part B:
■ Drugs that are not self-administered6 and that are furnished “incident
to” a physician’s service, such as prostate cancer drugs.
■ Certain self-administered oral cancer and antinausea drugs.
■ Certain drugs used as part of durable medical equipment or infusion
devices, such as inhalation drugs used with a nebulizer.
■ Immunosuppressive drugs, which are used following organ trans-
plants.
■ Erythropoietin (EPO), which is the most costly drug for Medicare
and is used primarily to treat anemia in patients with end-stage renal
disease or cancer.
■ Osteoporosis drugs furnished to certain beneficiaries by home health
agencies.
■ Vaccines for diseases such as influenza, pneumonia, and hepatitis.
These drugs are typically provided in the hospital outpatient setting, di-
alysis centers, or the doctor’s office, and are purchased directly by the
physician or provider.7
In 1999, Medicare spent almost $4 billion on outpatient drugs,8 with 82
percent of that cost attributable to 35 drugs, primarily cancer, inhalation
therapy, and oral immunosuppressive medications. It is clear, therefore,
that even a slight inflation in the cost of these drugs can result in signifi-
cantly higher aggregate spending by the government.
Drugs provided in a physician’s office accounted for over 75 percent of
Medicare spending for outpatient drugs in 1999. Three specialties, hema-
tology/oncology, medical oncology, and urology, which bill Medicare
primarily for drugs used in the treatment of cancer, represented 80 per-
cent of total Medicare payments to physicians for drugs.9 Physicians are
also paid under the Medicare physician fee schedule for services associ-
ated with drug administration.
Reimbursement for Medicare Part B prescription drugs has undergone
significant change over the years. Prior to use of the AWP as a pricing
benchmark, Medicare Part B drugs were reimbursed on the basis of the
physician’s acquisition cost. That system was eventually replaced with
one based on 100 percent of the AWP, and then to the lower of the esti-
mated acquisition cost (EAC) or 95 percent of the AWP. EAC is often
determined by subtracting a percentage discount from a drug’s AWP.
Finally, on January 1, 1998, as a result of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
and in an effort to bring down costs, Medicare Part B began to reimburse
covered brand-name drugs at 95 percent of the AWP. For multisource
drugs—drugs with generic equivalents or brand-name drugs with at least
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one competing product—reimbursement is 95 per-
cent of the lower of (a) the median AWP of all ge-
neric forms of the drug and (b) the lowest brand-name
product’s AWP.10
A recent report indicated that the drug industry’s
published wholesale prices, which serve as the ba-
sis for Medicare payments to providers, are signifi-
cantly higher than the providers’ actual acquisition
costs. Physicians are able to obtain Medicare-cov-
ered drugs at prices significantly below current
Medicare payments. According to a September 2001
GAO report, the average discount from the AWP
for most physician-administered drugs ranged from
13 percent to 34 percent; two oncology drugs, in par-
ticular—Dolasetron mesylate and Leucovorin—had
discounts of 65 percent and 86 percent, respec-
tively.11 As a result of this disparity between the
AWP and the providers’ actual cost, providers are
able to benefit financially from these transactions.
(See Figure 1 for an example of this pricing struc-
ture.) In certain instances, drug manufacturers may
make even deeper discounts available to provid-
ers, in exchange for the providers’ willingness to
prescribe their drugs over those of their competi-
tors. The result is a wide range of unknown prices
being paid for prescription drugs by providers, who
are then reimbursed a fixed amount by Medicare, leading to widely vary-
ing profit margins for different doctors.
Providers argue that they need these additional profits to compensate for
the lack of adequate payments for the administration of these drugs under
the Medicare physician payment system, the RBRVS. Administration of
Part B drugs often involves additional costs resulting from special storage,
handling, and preparation requirements for these drugs. The president of
the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO), Larry Norton, M.D.,
stated in testimony that the Medicare reimbursement for chemotherapy
services is insufficient to adequately cover the cost of furnishing such ser-
vices. ASCO estimates that the Medicare reimbursement covers approxi-
mately 25 percent of the total costs of chemotherapy procedures.12 The so-
ciety supports a reduction in Medicare payment for drugs but not without
a simultaneous increase in physician payments for related services.
Other nonphysician health care providers and suppliers who provide
beneficiaries with covered drugs for infusion and inhalation therapies
using durable medical equipment (DME) and with blood clotting factor
for hemophilia also claim that the overpayment on the drugs allows them
to provide critical administrative and support services to beneficiaries.
Those services are otherwise not covered by Medicare.
FIGURE 1
Medicare Payment vs. Provider Cost for Part B
Outpatient Prescription Drugs: An Example
Source: Based on information from U.S. General Accounting Office,
Medicare: Payments for Covered Outpatient Drugs Exceed
Providers’ Cost, September 2001 (GAO-01-1118), Washington, D.C.
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In response to this issue of provider overpayment, the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA, now the Centers for Medicare and Med-
icaid Services, or CMS), in the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) issued a memorandum in September 2000 that autho-
rized the use of reduced prices that more accurately reflected provider
acquisition costs for reimbursement of Medicare-covered drugs.13 The
memo states: “These data are from wholesalers’ catalogs that list the
prices at which the wholesaler sells the respective products. The DOJ
has indicated that these are more accurate wholesale prices for these
drugs.” After significant protest by oncology providers, however, HCFA
notified Congress that it would not move forward with its effort to imple-
ment revised average wholesale pricing data.
Other Medicare suppliers also purchase drugs at prices that are signifi-
cantly lower than the AWP. Pharmacy suppliers, who provide two types
of drugs—drugs administered through DME and covered oral drugs—
were the predominant billers for ten of the high-expenditure and high-
volume drugs analyzed by GAO. Discounts for two of these drugs were
78 percent and 85 percent, according to GAO.14
MEDICAID
The increasing cost of prescription drugs is playing a major role in the
dismal outlook for state Medicaid budgets across the country. Prescrip-
tion drugs constitute a rapidly growing component of total Medicaid
spending. Although coverage of outpatient prescription drugs is an op-
tional benefit, all Medicaid programs currently offer prescription drug
coverage to their Medicaid enrollees.15 Medicaid drug expenditures grew
at an average annual rate of 18.1 percent between 1997 and 2000, which is
more than two times the 7.7 percent annual growth in total Medicaid
spending. Drug spending accounted for nearly 20 percent of the increase
in Medicaid spending for this period.16
Medicaid payments for outpatient prescription drugs include three com-
ponents: acquisition costs, dispensing fees, and a rebate. The acquisition costs
cover the ingredients, or the drug itself, while the dispensing fee covers
the pharmacist’s costs of filling the prescription. The rebate is a mecha-
nism for reducing the effective price of the drug below the traditional
acquisition cost.
Acquisition Costs
Federal Medicaid law does not dictate the amount that a state may pay
for the drug itself. It does, however, place limits on what the federal gov-
ernment will match. These limits differ for brand-name drugs and ge-
neric drugs. For brand-name drugs or for generic drugs with fewer than
three generic versions the reimbursement is the lower of (a) the
pharmacist’s usual and customary charge to the general public and (b)
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the drug’s estimated acquisition cost.17 The EAC is a state’s estimate of
the price generally paid by providers for the drug. States generally use a
drug’s AWP to calculate its EAC. Most states pay for drugs at a percent-
age discount below a drug’s published AWP.18 Information compiled by
the National Pharmaceutical Council indicates that the reimbursement
formulas for state Medicaid agencies range from AWP minus 4 percent in
Wyoming to AWP minus 15.1 percent (for pharmacies with more than
five stores) in Michigan. (See Appendix 1 for a complete list of the state
Medicaid reimbursement formulas.) The average is 10.31 percent below
AWP, according to the DHHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). The dif-
ference between the pharmacy’s cost of obtaining the drug and the reim-
bursement amount is retained by the pharmacy.19 According to people
within the pharmacy industry, this difference enables pharmacies to cover
their costs in states where dispensing fees are inadequate to cover the
pharmacy’s dispensing costs (which average between $7 and $8).
In 1987, Medicaid regulations established the federal upper limit (FUL),
which set limits on the amount that Medicaid could reimburse for drugs
with three or more generic versions.20 The goal of the FUL was to enable the
federal government to recognize savings by taking into account market
prices. The payment ceiling for this group of drugs is set at 150 percent of
the published price for the least costly therapeutic equivalent that can be
purchased by pharmacists in quantities of 100 tablets or capsules.21 States
may set their own payment ceilings for these drugs, provided they do
not exceed the federal payment limit.22
An August 2001 report by the OIG found that the average acquisition
cost paid by pharmacies for brand-name drugs in 1999 was 21.84 percent
below AWP. The same report estimated that the Medicaid program could
have saved as much as $1.08 billion if reimbursement had been based on
an average discount of 21.84 percent below AWP. The OIG recommended
that CMS require states to bring pharmacy reimbursement for brand-name
drugs more in line with these actual acquisition costs.23
Representatives of community pharmacists and chain drug stores had
concerns with the methodology and findings of the OIG report and com-
missioned a study by researchers at the Center for Pharmacoeconomics
Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. The center’s study identified
problems with various aspects of the OIG report, including the categori-
zation of drugs as “brand-name” or “generic” and the use of a dispropor-
tionate number of prices from urban chain pharmacies.24 In response to
the concerns expressed by these groups, the OIG indicated in early 2002
that it will conduct additional analysis of Medicaid pharmacy pricing
data, using a different methodology, as advocated by the concerned
groups.25 The results of this analysis were not yet available at the time of
this writing.
An investigation by the DOJ and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud
Control Units found that some drug manufacturers were reporting inflated
Most states pay for
drugs at a percentage
discount below a
drug’s published AWP.
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AWPs. As a result of this finding, the DOJ and NAMFCU collected actual
wholesale pricing information for 51 drugs, which led to the calculation
of revised wholesale prices for those drugs. These revised prices were
provided to state Medicaid programs. According to a September 2001
report by the OIG, 30 states use at least some of the revised prices in their
drug reimbursement calculations.26 These revised prices, while provid-
ing some short-term savings for a limited number of drugs, do not solve
the underlying problem of accountability or accuracy of the AWP. CMS
continues to explore administrative and legislative solutions to the prob-
lem of state overpayment for Medicaid prescription drugs.
Dispensing Fees
In addition to the cost of the drug itself, state Medicaid agencies pay phar-
macies a dispensing fee to cover the costs of filling each prescription.
According to CMS regulations, the fee must be “reasonable,” though this
term is not defined. Each state negotiates and sets its own dispensing fee,
leading to wide variation in these fees across the states. A summer 2000
survey commissioned by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured and conducted by Health Systems Research, Inc., indicated
that dispensing fees range from $2.50 per prescription in New Hamp-
shire to between $3.69 and $15.70 per prescription in Illinois.27
Medicaid Rebates
To fully understand Medicaid reimbursement for prescription drugs, it is
important to understand the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program and the
pricing mechanisms on which it is based. In response to concern about
the increasing cost of prescription drugs for Medicaid beneficiaries, the
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program was implemented as part of the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. This program requires drug manu-
facturers to sign a rebate agreement with the federal government in order
to receive payment for outpatient prescription drugs provided to Medic-
aid beneficiaries. In exchange, states must cover all Food and Drug Ad-
ministration-approved prescription drug products manufactured by a
company that has signed a drug rebate agreement.28 This process imitates
what occurs with large private purchasers, who negotiate discounts in
exchange for the placement of particular drugs on their formularies.
The Medicaid rebate amounts are established by federal statute and dif-
fer for brand-name and generic drugs. They are determined as follows:
For brand-name drugs, reimbursement requires (a) a rebate that is the
greater of 15.1 percent of the average manufacturer’s price (AMP) or the
difference between the AMP and the manufacturer’s “best price”29 and
(b) an additional rebate for any product whose price increased by more
than the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) since July 1, 1990 (see Figure 2
for an example of Medicaid drug reimbursement). AMP is the average
price paid to manufacturers by wholesalers (after all discounts, including
Each state negotiates
and sets its own dis-
pensing fee, leading to
wide variation in these
fees across the states.
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manufacturer rebates) for a particular dosage form and
strength of a prescription drug distributed solely to the
retail pharmacy class of trade. The AMP is not a pub-
lished price. It is calculated by the manufacturer and
submitted to CMS for purposes of calculating the Med-
icaid rebate. The government holds it confidentially, to
protect the proprietary nature of the deals negotiated
between manufacturers and their best customers. AMP
is subject to government audits, making manufacturers
accountable for its accuracy. As noted later in the “Re-
form Options” section, President Bush’s 2003 budget
contains a proposal that would replace the AMP with
the AWP in the Medicaid rebate calculation. The “best
price” was intended to represent the lowest price offered
to any other customer, excluding Federal Supply Sched-
ule (FSS) prices, prices to state pharmaceutical assistance
programs, and prices for certain other purchasers. In an
industry with a proliferation of complex relationships
and financing arrangements, however, many question
whether the “best price” truly captures the myriad dis-
counts and rebates that exist.
The combined effect of the minimum rebate and the best-
price provision guarantees a larger rebate to the gov-
ernment for those drugs for which the best customers
are receiving a particularly favorable price. However, it
does not actually provide Medicaid with the same low
price the best private customers pay. Medicaid’s net price
after the rebate is higher because its payment to the phar-
macy, which is based on the “AWP minus x” formula, is higher than the
AMP. A “best price” rebate based on the difference between the best price
and the AMP leaves a higher net price. For generic drugs, reimbursement
requires a rebate of 11 percent of each product’s AMP.30
OTHER PUBLIC AND QUASI-PUBLIC PROGRAMS
340B Drug Discount Program
Following implementation of the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, drug
manufacturers had a disincentive to provide deep discounts to non-Med-
icaid purchasers because the manufacturers would then be required to
extend such discounts to Medicaid. Some drug manufacturers chose to
raise their “best prices,” thereby increasing the cost to other federal- and
state-supported providers. In response, Congress enacted Section 340B
of the Public Health Service Act in November 1992, which requires drug
manufacturers who participate in the Medicaid program to enter into an
agreement with the secretary of health and human services. Under this
FIGURE 2
Medicaid Drug Reimbursement Example
Assumptions:
■A state Medicaid reimbursement formula of AWP minus 10%.
■No state “usual or customary” standard for drug reimbursement.
■A dispensing fee of $3.00.
■ The difference between the drug’s AMP and the manufacturer’s
“best price” is not greater than 15.1 percent of the drug’s AMP.
■ The drug is not a generic, which would have a rebate of 11%
of AMP.
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agreement, the manufacturer agrees to provide discounts on drugs pur-
chased by “covered entities” that serve vulnerable patient populations.
“Covered entities” include certain high-volume disproportionate share
hospitals, as well as specified grantees of the Public Health Service, in-
cluding certain federally qualified health centers, state-operated AIDS
drug assistance programs, public housing primary care clinics, and home-
less clinics.
As a condition for participation in Medicaid, the law requires manufac-
turers to charge covered entities a price for covered outpatient drugs that
will not exceed an amount determined by a statutory formula. For most
drugs, the discount is the AMP, reduced by a rebate percentage equiva-
lent to the Medicaid rebate amount. (As noted above, that rebate amount
is 15.1 percent of AMP for brand-name drugs and 11 percent of AMP for
generic drugs.) These discounts are similar to those received by the Med-
icaid program, but these facilities may negotiate even deeper discounts.
Federal Supply Schedule
Prices paid to manufacturers by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
other federal agencies, and certain other entities, such as Indian tribal
governments, are set by the FSS for pharmaceuticals. The FSS, which is
administered by the VA, is a list of pharmaceutical products and prices
that are available to federal entities. Under the Veterans Health Care Act
of 1992, manufacturers must make drugs available to covered entities at
the FSS price as a condition of eligibility for Medicaid reimbursement.31
In addition, manufacturers must sell brand-name drugs that are included
in the FSS to the VA, Department of Defense, Public Health Service, and
Coast Guard at prices that are at least 24 percent below the nonfederal
average manufacturer price, a ceiling price that is lower than the FSS price
for many drugs.32 The FSS is derived from actual market transaction data
reported by drug manufacturers. Generally, the FSS price may not be
higher than the lowest contractual price charged by the manufacturer to
any nonfederal purchaser. The VA routinely uses competitive bidding to
obtain lower drug prices. According to GAO, this results in prices that
are approximately one-third lower than FSS prices. The FSS price is not
included in a manufacturer’s “best price” for purposes of calculating the
Medicaid rebate.
Enabling Medicare beneficiaries to purchase drugs at FSS prices has, on
different occasions, been raised as a possible means of lowering drug costs
for this population. Of significant concern, however, is the impact this would
have on other purchasers and, ultimately, on the FSS prices themselves. As
the number of purchasers with access to FSS prices for prescription drugs
increased, manufacturers would inevitably be driven to offset this de-
crease in revenue with price increases for nonfederal purchasers. This in
turn would drive up FSS prices, which are benchmarked against
nonfederal purchaser prices.
Manufacturers must
make drugs available to
covered entities at the
FSS price as a condition
of eligibility for Medic-
aid reimbursement.
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PRIVATE PAYERS
Private payers, especially large-volume purchasers, are able to negotiate
deep discounts with drug manufacturers. Many private payers, includ-
ing employers and managed care organizations, often contract with phar-
macy benefit managers (PBMs) to manage prescription drug benefits for
their enrollees. PBMs serve as intermediaries between these third-party
payers and drug manufacturers, retail pharmacies, pharmacists, and
wholesalers.33 PBMs base their pharmacy reimbursements on the AWP
for brand-name drugs. While they do not actually purchase drugs, ex-
cept in the case of mail-order business, PBMs are able to negotiate dis-
counts with retail pharmacies and provide incentives for pharmacists’
use of less costly generics and on-formulary drugs. They also negotiate
with wholesalers for mail-order services and drug manufacturers, who
are eager to ensure that their products are included in drug formularies
and to encourage the use of their drugs over their competitors’ drugs.34
The main streams of revenue for PBMs are manufacturer rebates and the
difference between their drug acquisition costs and sales costs for mail-
order prescription drugs. PBMs contract with drug manufacturers for re-
bates that range between 2 percent and 20 percent of a drug’s AWP.35
LITIGATION
In addition to significant attention by federal government agencies, drug
company pricing practices have also come under attack within the court
system. The issue of AWP manipulation can be found in several notewor-
thy legal actions. These cases will undoubtedly have an impact on future
discussions of this issue.
■ Bayer Corporation, in September 2000, agreed to pay $14 million to
the United States and 47 states to settle allegations under the federal
False Claims Act. The allegations contend that beginning in the early
1990s, Bayer falsely inflated its AWPs, causing physicians, pharmacists,
and home health companies to submit fraudulently inflated reimburse-
ment claims to the state Medicaid programs.
■ TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., agreed in October 2001 to pay $875
million to resolve criminal and civil liabilities in connection with its
alleged fraudulent drug pricing and marketing conduct with regard to
Lupron, a prostate cancer drug. In its case against TAP, the U.S. Govern-
ment alleged that TAP set its AWP of Lupron far higher than the price for
which wholesalers or distributors actually sold the drug, resulting in
falsely inflated prices. As part of its settlement agreement, TAP also
agreed to report to the OIG, on a quarterly basis, its average sales price
(ASP) for all of its products reimbursed by the government.
■ The Nevada attorney general filed suit against 12 drug companies,
alleging that the companies engaged in deceptive trade practices by
manipulating or misstating their drugs’ AWPs, leading states, consum-
ers, and others to significantly overpay for drugs.
Private payers are able
to negotiate deep dis-
counts with drug man-
ufacturers.
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■ The Montana attorney general filed suit against 18 drug companies
on February 25, 2002, alleging that they illegally misstated the average
wholesale prices of their medications. The attorney general alleges that
the drug companies engaged in Medicaid fraud, caused false claims to
be made to the state, and participated in deceptive trade practices by
manipulating or misstating the average wholesale price of drugs,
causing the state, consumers, and others to grossly overpay for pre-
scription drugs.
■ A coalition of consumer groups filed suit in December 2001 against 28
drug companies for manipulating the AWP of drugs covered by Medi-
care. The lawsuit charges that, since 1993, the companies have engaged in
“a pattern and practice” of selling drugs to physicians at prices well
below the reimbursement cost charged to Medicare, resulting in viola-
tions of consumer laws and racketeering statutes. The plaintiffs estimate
that Medicare and individual consumers using the drugs were over-
charged more than $800 million in 2000 alone.
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING REFORM
Experts caution that any attempt to change the current reimbursement sys-
tem for prescription drugs and, in particular, reliance on the AWP as a pric-
ing benchmark, must be done with careful consideration of the many policy
implications. The AWP is utilized across many different settings, and
changes in the use of this benchmark are likely to produce varying results
in each setting. Policymakers and legislators are considering several ques-
tions as they contemplate AWP reform. These include the following:
■ How will each stakeholder—purchaser, pharmacy, provider, PBM,
drug manufacturer, wholesaler, and patient—benefit or be negatively
affected by this change?
■ What types of incentives would be created if a new prescription drug
pricing benchmark were to be used?
■ What is the potential for manipulation of any proposed benchmark?
■ Will the proposed system rely on data that can be audited? Who will
be responsible for such audits? Are there sufficient resources?
■ How, and how often, will these data be updated?
■ How can accountability be assured without requiring drug manufac-
turers to divulge proprietary pricing information?
■ What are the implications of making the AMP public?
■ To whom will any potential discounts flow?
■ How can government and consumer savings be assured?
■ What will be the impact on other related payment systems, for
example, RBRVS and diagnosis-related group, or DRG? Should the
reform of these systems also be contemplated?
■ What administrative costs and burdens will be associated with an
alternative pricing mechanism?
Changes in the use of
the AWP are likely to
produce varying re-
sults in each setting.
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Pricing and Reimbursement Reform Options
Different recommendations have been made for the legislative and regu-
latory reform of the prescription drug reimbursement system. One such
recommendation is the adjustment of the percentage below AWP at which
Medicaid and Medicare reimburse prescription drugs, making it more
reflective of actual acquisition costs. Some experts caution, however, that
merely lowering the percentage below AWP at which prescription drugs
are reimbursed perpetuates the existing problem by creating incentives
for continued AWP manipulation. GAO has recommended that CMS bring
reimbursement rates for Medicare Part B–covered drugs more in line with
provider acquisition costs and evaluate expanding competitive bidding
approaches to setting payment levels.36
As noted previously, attempts to bring Medicare drug reimbursement
rates more in line with market prices have been met with much resistance
from providers. Oncologists, in particular, argue that the higher drug
payments they receive for chemotherapy drugs are needed in order to
compensate them for the inadequate payments they receive from Medi-
care for the services they provide in administering the drugs.37
Another proposed reform is the replacement of the AWP with a different
reportable figure. For example, the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee has proposed requiring drug manufacturers to report a new fig-
ure, the average sales price, that reflects the true cost of purchasing pre-
scription drugs, including manufacturer-provided rebates, charge backs,
and other discounts to purchasers. Medicare reimbursement would then
be based on this new ASP. This new system would replace use of the AWP.38
While the ASP proposal appears to replace the AWP with a figure that is
more closely aligned with the actual cost of prescription drugs, the ap-
propriateness of such a figure, like AWP, will hinge on the manner in
which it is calculated, reported, and employed. The “true cost” of drugs
varies widely within the industry, making a standard price difficult to
capture. For example, some rebates are designed in such a way that they
are not tied to a particular drug, perhaps to avoid having them count in the
Medicaid “best price” determination. Given the intense legislative debate
currently taking place around the establishment of a comprehensive Medi-
care prescription drug benefit and the sensitivity of prescription drug
pricing to the many stakeholders involved, the details (for example the
relationship between ASP and AMP) necessary to fully evaluate the dif-
ferent legislative proposals have not been made publicly available.
A third option for reform would be to move to a competitive bidding
process, a reform that has been recommended by the majority staff of the
House Ways and Means Committee. The AWP system of Medicare drug
reimbursement would be replaced entirely. Contract entities would com-
petitively bid with CMS to provide covered drugs. Physicians would
purchase drugs through these entities at the best possible price in order
to retain the difference between their cost and the reimbursement rate
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from CMS. The CMS payment would be based on the average of all the
bids by contract entities for a particular drug. Physicians would continue
to receive an additional payment for the administration of the drug.
While the idea of injecting greater competition into the Medicare drug
reimbursement system would seem like one that would garner signifi-
cant support, efforts to use competitive pricing within the Medicare pro-
gram in the past have not been successful.39 One exception to this has
been the Medicare DME competitive bidding demonstration, which has
experienced some success.
And finally, included in Bush’s proposed 2003 budget is a provision that
would alter the way in which the Medicaid drug rebate is calculated. As
discussed above, the rebate is currently calculated from the difference be-
tween the manufacturer’s “best price” and the AMP. The budget proposal
would substitute the AWP for the AMP, making it more reflective of how
states purchase drugs. This would eliminate the need for two distinct pric-
ing mechanisms within one system, one for state Medicaid reimbursement
formulas and the second for calculation of the Medicaid rebate. According
to the budget proposal, this change would generate $290 million in savings
for 2003 and $5.5 billion over five years. With the Medicaid rebate calcula-
tion tied to a drug’s AWP, manufacturers would arguably have an incen-
tive to keep AWPs lower, whereas a higher AWP would increase the reim-
bursement received by pharmacies. Removing the AMP from the Medic-
aid rebate calculation also eliminates the accountability and auditability
that comes with the use of a figure that is highly proprietary and reported
directly by manufacturers to the federal government.
CONCLUSION
The AWP, a pricing mechanism that by most accounts is seriously flawed
and not widely understood, plays a pivotal role in the overall prescrip-
tion drug pricing and reimbursement systems. It has become a critical
benchmark for key stakeholders, despite its inability to accurately reflect
the “true cost” of drugs. Yet, as we have seen, the true cost of a given drug
depends on the various discounts, rebates, and reimbursement formulas
available to a particular purchaser—both public and private. Other al-
ternatives to the AWP may suffer from similar flaws, namely, being sub-
ject to manipulation and not closely aligned with real market transaction
prices. The creation of an appropriate payment mechanism for prescrip-
tion drugs, therefore, will need to involve a careful balance between pro-
tecting the proprietary nature of drug pricing information and ensuring
the accuracy of, and accountability for, the information on which such a
payment mechanism is based.
The AWP has become
a critical benchmark
for key stakeholders,
despite its inability to
accurately reflect the
true cost of drugs.
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GLOSSARY
Average Manufacturer’s Price (AMP)—AMP is the average price paid
to manufacturers by wholesalers (after discounts) for a particular dosage
form and strength of a prescription drug distributed solely to the retail
pharmacy class of trade. The AMP is not a published price. It is calcu-
lated by the manufacturer and submitted to CMS for purposes of calcu-
lating the Medicaid rebate.
Average Sales Price (ASP)—As defined in the TAP Corporate Integrity
Agreement, ASP is the average of all final sales prices charged for the
product in the United States to all purchasers, excluding those sales that
are exempt from inclusion in the “best price” for Medicaid drug rebate
purposes.
Average Wholesale Price (AWP)—AWP is a figure that is reported by
commercial publishers of drug pricing data, based on wholesale pricing
information provided to them by drug manufacturers. This published
pricing information is purchased by government entities, private insur-
ance companies, and other purchasers and serves as the basis for pre-
scription drug reimbursement. The AWP has often been equated with a
“sticker price” or “list price.”
Estimated Acquisition Cost (EAC)—The EAC is a state’s estimate of the
price generally paid by providers for a particular drug. Most states use a
drug’s AWP to calculate the drug’s EAC.
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS)—The FSS is derived from actual market
transaction data reported by drug manufacturers. Generally, the FSS price
may not be higher than the lowest contractual price charged by the manu-
facturer to any nonfederal purchaser. Prices paid to manufacturers by the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), other federal agencies, and certain
other entities, such as Indian tribal governments, are set by the FSS.
Federal Upper Limit (FUL)—The federal payment ceiling that applies to
drugs with three or more generic versions. The FUL is set at 150 percent
of the published price (in any of the published compendia of cost infor-
mation for drugs) for the least costly therapeutic equivalent that can be
purchased by pharmacists in quantities of 100 tablets or capsules.40
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC)—MACs represent upper limit prices
that an insurer or health plan will reimburse for generically available or
multiple source medications. This typically follows the initiative for re-
imbursement by the Medicare or Medicaid program when more than two
generic drugs are available in the marketplace.41
Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC)—The manufacturer’s charge to the
wholesaler to purchase the drug. The WAC is a published price and does
not generally reflect any rebates or discounts. It is often referred to as the
“catalogue” price.
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State Dispensing Fee Ingredient Reimbursement Basis Copayment
Alabama $5.40 AWP- 10%; WAC+9.2% $0.50 - $3.00
Alaska $3.45 AWP-5% $2.00
Arizona* - - -
Arkansas $5.51 AWP-10.5% $0.50 - $3.00
California $4.05 AWP-5% $1.00
AWP-11% or WAC+18%,
Colorado $4.00 whichever is lowest G: $0.75, B: $3.00
Connecticut $4.10 AWP-12% None
Delaware $3.65 AWP-12.9% None
DC $3.75 AWP-10% $1.00
Florida $4.23-$4.73 AWP-13.25%; WAC+7% None
G/P: $0.50, B/NP:
Georgia $4.63 + $0.50 for G or P AWP-10% $0.50 - $3.00
Hawaii $4.67 AWP-10.5% None
Idaho $4.94 ($5.54 for unit dose) AWP-12% None
Illinois G: $5.10, B: $4.00 AWP-11% $1.00
Indiana $4.00 AWP-10% $0.50 - $3.00
Iowa $5.17 AWP-10% $1.00
AWP-10%, IV AWP-50%,
Kansas $4.50 blood AWP-30% $2.00
Kentucky $4.50 AWP-10% None
AWP-13.5% (AWP-15% for
Louisiana $5.77 chains) $0.50 - $3.00
$3.35 (+extra fees for
Maine compounding) AWP-10% $0.50 - $3.00
Lowest of :WAC+10%,
Maryland $4.21 direct+10%, AWP-10% $1.00
Massachusetts $3.00 WAC+10% $0.50
AWP-13.5% (1-4 stores),
Michigan $3.72 AWP-15.1% (5+stores) $1.00
Minnesota $3.65 AWP-9% None
Mississippi $4.91 AWP-10% $1.00
$0.50 - $2.00,  $5.00 for
Missouri $4.09 AWP-10.43%, WAC+10% some 1115 pop.
AWP-10%,
Montana $2.00 - $4.20 direct price for some labelers G: $1.00, B: $2.00
Appendix 1: Pharmacy Payment and Patient Cost Sharing
continued
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State Dispensing Fee Ingredient Reimbursement Basis Copayment
Nebraska $3.84 - $5.05 AWP-10% $1.00
Nevada $4.76 AWP-10% None
New Hampshire $2.50 AWP-12% G: $0.50, B: $1.00
AWP-10%, WAC+30%,
New Jersey $3.73 - $4.07 AAC for injectables None
None (except CHIP
New Mexico $4.00 AWP-12.5% and working disabled)
New York B: $3.50 G: $4.50 AWP-10% G: $0.50, B: $2.00
North Carolina $5.60 AWP-10% $1.00
North Dakota $4.60 AWP-10% None
Ohio $3.70 AWP-11% None
Oklahoma $4.15 AWP-12.0% $1.00 - $2.00
Retail: $3.50 Inst./
Oregon NF: $3.80 AWP-13% None
Pennsylvania $4.00 AWP-10% $1.00 ($2.00 for GA)
Rhode Island OP: $3.40, LTC: $2.85 WAC+5% None
South Carolina $4.05 AWP-10% $3.00
South Dakota $4.75 ($5.55 for unit dose) AWP-10.5% $2.00
Tennessee* - - -
(EAC+$5.27)/ AWP-15% or WAC+12%,
Texas 0.98 & delivery fee whichever is lowest None
$3.90-$4.40
Utah (based on area) AWP-12% $1.00, max. $5.00/mo.
Vermont $4.25 AWP-11.9% $1.00 - $2.00
Virginia $4.25 AWP-9% $1.00
Washington $4.14-$5.12 AWP-11% None
(based on annual # of Rx)
$3.90 (+ extra $1.00 for
West Virginia  compounding) AWP-12% $0.50 - $2.00
$4.88 (to a maximum $1.00, max. $5/recip./
Wisconsin  $40.11) AWP-11.25% pharm./mo.
Wyoming $5.00 AWP-11% $2.00
WAC = Wholesalers’ Acquisition Cost; AWP = Average Wholesale Price; EAC = Estimated Acquisition Cost;  AAC= Actual Acquisition Cost;
G = Generic; B = Brand Name; OP = Outpatient; LTC = Long-Term Care; P = Preferred; NP = Nonpreferred.
*Within federal and state guidelines, individual managed care and pharmacy benefit management organizations make formulary/drug decisions.
Source: As reported by state drug program administrators in the 2001 National Pharmaceutical Council Survey.
Appendix 1 (cont.)
